Abstract -A VLSI architecture for synchronous sequential controllers is presented that has attractive qualities for producing reliable circuits. In these circuits, one hardware implementation can realize any flow table with a maximum of 2 n internal states and ra inputs. Also all design equations are identical. A real time fault detection means is presented along with a strategy for verifying the correctness of the checking hardware. This self check feature can be employed with no increase in hardware. The architecture can be modified to achieve fail safe designs. With no increase in hardware, an adaptable circuit can be realized that allows replacement of faulty transitions with fault free transitions.
Introduction
This paper presents a VLSI architecture for controllers that provides real time fault detection and reliability enhancements. The reliability advances are based on a new VLSI architecture for synchronous sequential circuits. This controller design supports important features such as real time fault detection, fail safeness and fault tolerance. The class of faults that is covered by this design are stuck-at, stuck-open and stuck-on. Controllers on two full custom VLSI data compression chips for NASA have been implemented using this architecture [1] .
Most digital systems include a controller. This can be either a general machine such as a microprocessor, or a dedicated, custom designed sequential state machine. Dedicated controllers can be implemented as programmable PL A based structures, or as a random logic designs. The realization of state machines based on random logic often results in the most compact and highest performance circuits, but the logic is a function of the state assignment, flip flop type and flow table (actual sequence). Controllers can also be implemented in PLA structures, reducing the layout effort, but are less area efficient and have reduced system performance. PLA based controllers can be reconfigured to some extent but the reconfigurability is limited by the number of minterms available in the PLA.
An architecture that retains the traditional strengths of dedicated state machines, but offers the programmability of a microcontroller was presented in [2] . This architecture produces controllers whose logic is invariant with respect to the actual sequence desired. State machines designed using this method approach the performance and size of random logic based state machines and have a programmability superior to a PLA based design.
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Binary Tree Structured Logic
Pass transistor logic can have significant advantages in speed and density when compared with gate logic [3, 4] . A pass transistor network realized in Binary Tree Structure (BTS) form often requires fewer transistors and displays attractive fault detection characteristics [3] . In general, a BTS circuit is characterized by having a maximum of 2" -1 nodes, each node having exactly two branches. One branch is controlled by variable Xi and the other by x7. The maximum number of transistors in a BTS network is 2 n+1 -2. A general BTS network contains the maximum number of transistors and represents a complete decoding of an input space and hence only constants are input to the network. A general BTS network is employed here to formulate the next state equations for sequential circuits. Figure 1 shows a general BTS network which implements all three-variable functions, any of which can be realized by simply changing the pass variable constants, 1(0), at the input to the appropriate branch.
The delay through a series string of pass transistors is proportional to the square of the number pass transistors. This limits the size of a sequential circuit using BTS structures to about 5 state variables. However, this is not a significant limitation. Large state controllers can almost always be partitioned into small distributed state machines. Two full custom developments [5, 6] predecessor state for 5< is the code for Si and the constants for this code are input to the BTS network. A general block diagram is shown in Figure 2 , where the next state logic is a general BTS network.
Operation
The following illustrates specifically how this architecture works. Let Table 2 The next state logic is a general BTS circuit with paths that decode each state. The input switch matrix is a pass transistor matrix, that passes the destination state codes to the next state pass network as shown in Figure 3 . The circuit realization of this network operates in the following manner: All of the destination state codes N^ are presented to the input switch matrix. For each input state I,-, all of the destination states in I, are presented to the next state logic. The present state variables, y, select one and only one next state entry which is passed to the flip-flips. If the machine is in state 5i and input J 2 is asserted, then N^ would be passed to the input of the flip-flop for next state variable Yi. The current input state selects the set of potential next states that the circuit can assume (selects the input column) and the present state variables select the exact next state (row in the flow table) that the circuit will assume at the next clock pulse.
Design Example
Consider the state assignment and next state entries shown in Table 3 . The circuit in Figure 3 shows the logic for implementing each state variable j/,-. Each state is covered by a path through the BTS network that forms the next state logic. The logic of Figure  3 is replicated three times and the inputs are driven by the destination state information which is taken from Table 3 . Figure 4 shows the programming of the input switch matrix for next state variable Y 3 . Except for the constant values driving the input switch matrix, the design equations and pass transistor realizations for each state variable are identical. 
Safe Operation
In some circuit designs it is possible to enter states that are not specified in the original flow table and it is then impossible to return to an original specified state. If this occurs, the circuit is termed unsafe [7] . The above architecture can be guaranteed to operate safely by simply defining the next state for all unspecified states as any of the originally specified states. Since the BTS network generates the next states for all possible states, there is no increase in the hardware necessary to produce a safe design.
4 Reliable Design
Real Time Fault Detection
In the following discussion, specified internal states denote those states that are specified in the original flow table and fault states denote those that do not appear in the original flow table. For example, in Table 3 state 001 is a specified state and 110 is a fault state. A circuit never enters a fault state under fault free conditions.
A key feature of the design presented in the previous section is that each state variable utilizes independent logic. Because of this feature, a failure in any component in the BTS network affects at most only one state variable. The occurrence of a fault may force the circuit into a state that is at most a distance one from the intended state.
Meyer has shown that a minimum distance-two state assignment will provide real time fault detection if the fault detector can detect the presence of a fault state within one clock period [8] . With a minimum distance-two state assignment, a single fault forces the circuit into a fault state. When this happens, the fault detector must simply detect the presence of fault states to detect the presence of a fault. For example, suppose the state assignment encodes all specified states to possess even parity and encodes the fault states to have odd parity. The fault detector would simply detect the presence of odd parity over the state variables. The hardware for this fault detector could be realized by adding another BTS network that is identical to any state variable circuit. However, a smaller more efficient fault detector would be a simple exclusive-or gate. A typical VLSI trade-off has to be made at this point. If design time is important, then replicating the BTS network is best; if minimum area is critical, then implementing the exclusive-or gate is best. Open-circuit faults often create problems for fault detection because the charge stored on the node can mask failures. For example, if a transistor experiences an open circuit, the input to the D flip-flop will float when the path with the faulted transistor is enabled. If the previous input value to a flip-flop is 1(0) and the next value ought to be 1(0), then the state variable will not change when an open circuit is present. This assumes that the inputs change at a rate faster than the time it takes to discharge the input node to the flip-flop. In the case where there is no change in state, the circuit remains in a proper state and the fault is not detected. The circuit will malfunction whenever the previous input value to a flip-flop is 1(0) and the next value ought to be 0(1). In this situation, the input should transition but the presence of an open circuit does not allow a transition. Whenever the faulted path ought to force a transition in a flip-flop and does not, the presence of an open circuit will result in an unchanged state variable and the circuit entering a fault state which is detectable. In general, the fault detector detects only those faults that cause the circuit to assume a fault state. Open-circuit faults which cause a circuit to remain in a proper state are not detectable.
Only one extra state variable is needed to translate a minimum variable state assignment into a minimum distance-two state assignment. As stated above, a BTS circuit identical to a state variable can be used as the fault detector. Therefore, two additional BTS circuits are required to provide real time fault detection. If n BTS circuits are needed to implement a non-fault detecting circuit, then n + 2 BTS circuits are needed for real time fault detection. The depth of the each BTS circuit increases by one upon adding an additional state variable. Since each additional BTS circuit is identical, the extra VLSI layout and checking efforts are small.
Checking the checker is an important issue. To generate confidence in the checking hardware, it is important to have a mechanism that can achieve a self check. Detection of faults in the checking circuit itself is difficult because the states that the fault detector decodes are states that the circuit never enters under fault free conditions. One method to check for detector faults is to force the circuit into a fault state during an off-line test. A complete test would require that the circuit cycle through all fault states. Since the next state entries for the fault states are unspecified, it is a simple matter to specify the next state entries such that the circuit will cycle through the fault states.
Cycling through the fault states in the checking circuit is illustrated with the example shown in Table 4 . In this example, let the next state entry of all fault states be specified such that the circuit cycles through all the fault states when a fault state is entered. Shown in Figure 5 A BTS circuit can easily be altered to enter the above cycle. A single change in any one of the constants feeding an input to the BTS network, like the one shown in Figure  3 , will cause the circuit to enter the fault states. The input that effects the change can be an external signal to the controller. The important features of this fault checker are that it can be tested, there is no increase in hardware and the cycle test can be invoked externally.
Fail Safe Operation
A fail safe circuit is designed such that a fault can never produce an "unsafe" output. Whenever a fault occurs in a sequential circuit, the circuit must be forced into a well defined set of fault states with safe outputs. A circuit must not be allowed to assume random states, because unsafe outputs could be generated [9] .
In an n-van able minimum distance-two state assignment, there can be no more than 2 n~1 specified states; at least half of the total states are fault states. Under worst case conditions, a single fault will force the circuit into a fault state. For fail safe operation, the next state entries for the fault states must be specified in such a manner that they will prevent the circuit from re-entering any specified state. The circuit architecture defined earlier will allow the next state entries for fault states to be specified in any desired manner without a hardware penalty. A judicious choice of next state entries can provide the desired fail safe qualities.
Let So be the state where all state variables are 0. A fail safe design must consist of the following elements:
• Minimum distance-two state assignment
• S 0 and all states a distance one from So are specified as fault states
• All fault states are programmed with a next state entry of So
• Outputs are programmed to be safe in all fault states Since there is no sharing of hardware, the occurrence of a single fault can immediately affect no more than one state variable. Fail safe operation is guaranteed for the following set of fault conditions. Let the circuit be in state Sj with the next state entry Sj under input Ip. The combination of Si and I p selects a unique pass transistor path that presents the next state value for 5,-to the inputs of the flip-flops. Assume that a fault is propagated to cause faulty operation in a next state variable.
Stuck-at-fault within the BTS network A fault can occur in one of two locations: 2nd NASA SERC Symposium on VLSI Design 1990 2.1.11 1. A stuck-at-fault is present within the BTS network, including the primary input lines. In this case, the next state will be fault state Sj © e, where e is an n-tuple of weight 1. Since the next state for all fault states is So, the circuit transition is Sj -» Sf -> So-Since the next state for So is So, the circuit is safe.
2.
A fault occurs at the output of the BTS network for state variable Yk. In this case, fault state So © e is assumed, where e is an n-tuple that is all 0 except bit position k = 1. Since the next state entry for this state is the fault state So, the circuit will not transition further, and is therefore safe.
Consider the example in Figure 4 and the circuit shown in Figure 6 . The next state entry for the fault states are denoted with an "f" and are coded 0 for So-Let the current state be 6 (0110); the next state is 7 with code 0011. The pass transistor path corresponding to 0110 is enabled for each state variable, passing the code for state 7 to the output of the BTS network. If there is a stuck-at-1 fault along this path, then the possible next states are 1011, 0111 or 0011 depending on which next state variable is affected. Notice that a stuck-at-1 fault for either Y 3 or Y^ is masked since a 1 is suppose to be passed. If states 1011 or 0111 are entered, then the next state will be 0000, unless the outputs of the BTS network for YI or Y 2 are stuck-at-1, in which case the circuit will assume state 1000 or 0100. Since present state and next state are the same in all three cases, the circuit remains stable. A similar situation occurs for a stuck-at-0 fault except state So is entered and e = 0.
Transistor stuck-on If a given transistor is stuck-on, then two paths are enabled at some node. Along one path is the code for the specified state, and along the other is the code for SQ. If the two signals agree, the fault is masked. If they differ, then a conflict is present and the exact logic level is determined by the electrical characteristics of the network. If the path for code So dominates and propagates a 0 to the output, then the circuit will assume a fault state. At this point one of two things can happen:
1. The fault state can enable an entirely different set of transistors causing the stuck-on fault to be isolated and guarantees that the circuit enters fault state So-2. The fault state does not isolate the stuck-on fault. So will still be entered because only O's are being passed when the circuit is in the fault state.
Continuing with the above example, let the circuit be in state 6. If the transistor controlled by t/ 4 in path 0111 is stuck-on, then there is a conflict between 0 (coming from f) and 1 (coming from 7) at the first node. If the 1 dominates the 0, the circuit will operate fault free. If the 0 dominates the 1, then the next state will be 0001 or 0010 if Y 3 or Y t are affected. Either of these states will force the circuit to So and the operation is then fail safe. State variable stuck-at-1 If the output of flip-flop j/,-assumes a stuck-at-1 value, then an entire set of transistors controlled by T/J or its complement are turned on. Let the circuit be in state 5,-where yk = 0 and the output of the flip-flop for Yk becomes stuck-at-1. The BTS circuit will respond as if the circuit is in fault state Si ® e, where e is all 0 except for bit k = 1. The next state entry for this state is 0 for all state variables which will force the circuit to So © e. This state is another fault state with a next state entry of SQ. Therefore, the circuit is stable and safe.
This circuit cannot be guaranteed to operate in a fail safe manner for stuck-open or for state variable stuck-at-0 faults. These faults can disable the pass transistor path that drives the flip-flops and can cause a instate input to the flip-flops. A instate input to the flip-flops may or may not force the circuit to a fault state. The circuit can remain in the same valid state until the charge at the BTS output node leaks ofF. Many clock cycles could occur and since the circuit is in a valid state, the fault detector and fail safe circuitry would not respond to the failure.
Fault Tolerance
A designer can achieve fault tolerance using either of the following procedures:
1. Place an error-correcting code on the state assignment as proposed by Meyer [8] .
For single fault tolerance, all fault states adjacent to a specified state are encoded with the same next state entry as the specified state. If a single fault occurs, a fault state adjacent to the specified state is assumed. However, since the states adjacent to each specified state have the same next state entry, the circuit will transition to the proper next state, or at least to a state within a distance 1 of the specified state.
2. Use n + 1 safe circuits to achieve an n fault tolerant circuit [10] , Either a simple AND or a simple OR gate could be used to produce the fault tolerant output.
Adaptive Operation
One of the attractive features of the architecture proposed here is its adaptive nature. The constants, which are input to the BTS network, can either be derived from connections to Vdd and V, t lines or they can come from a register or other storage cell. Destination constants (codes) coming from a register can be changed. With each change of the destination constants an entirely different set of transitions can be implemented. If it would be possible to identify transitions that are affected by faults, then changing the flow table could be accomplished to avoid the faulty transition. For instance, if a given transition from state Si produced a malfunction and it was determined that some transistor along the path decoding Si had failed, then that particular pass transistor path could be a avoided. A spare non-fault state S, could assume the role of S,-and every transition to Si could then transition to state S,. This change can be effected with a new set of constants that define S, as the next state for all predecessor states of S,-. Moreover, all next state entries for Si can be mapped to 5,. Therefore, state S; is no longer entered and the particular pass transistor path that contained the fault is not used again.
Conclusion
A new architecture is presented that has attractive features for producing reliable sequential controllers. A design procedure that is applicable to VLSI is given for realizing the new architecture. Without any increase in hardware, a circuit can be designed to be safe. Through the addition of only one more state variable and its associated BTS network, a circuit can be realized that has real time fault detection and fail safe capabilities. The new architecture also allows for the implementation of adaptable circuits that are capable of initiating alternative transition sequences to replace those that are faulty. The adaptable nature of the circuit is achieved through no increase in the fail safe design hardware.
